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ABSTRACT OF CAPSTONE 
OUTBREAK SEVERITY INDEX 
 
Outbreaks are emergency situations that carry hazards of death, disability, 
loss of home and property, and variety of other calamities. With technological 
advancement, not only people and commodities are easy to transfer but also 
disease outbreaks. However, outbreaks are dealt with by different countries 
based on the differences in their healthcare systems and their ability to achieve 
effective control of the outbreak. SARS, MERS, and Ebola are example of such 
outbreaks that traveled around the globe and successful control was different 
according to the virulence of outbreak agent and to the effectiveness of local 
health system control measures. This capstone project proposes an outbreak 
severity index as an outbreak evaluation tool. The aim of the evaluation tool is to 
examine the severity of any emerging outbreak and to coordinate prevention and 
control efforts accordingly both locally and globally. Application of the outbreak 
severity index of SARS, MERS, and Ebola demonstrates that the score for 
SARS, MERS, and Ebola are 5.42, 5.36, and 5.0 respectively on a 10.0 points 
scale. This result indicates that SARS, MERS, and Ebola are moderate severe 
	  
	  
outbreaks. With this result, public health practitioners have an objective 
measurement tool to advocate for allocation of resources and for justifying 
preventive procedures. Validity and reliability are not tested, which would lead to 
acceptance of this evaluative approach and help in building consensus. 
Additional studies are needed to assess the proposed outbreak severity index.     
         
KEYWORDS: (Outbreak, severity index, global outbreak, SARS, MERS, 
Ebola, healthcare system, assessment tool, WHO, advocacy, global health, 
international cooperation) 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background: 
           Global disease outbreaks are not uncommon devastating events. Some of 
these outbreaks have been severe enough to destroy national civilizations [1]. 
The known history of outbreaks goes back 25 centuries to ancient Greece with 
the devastating outbreak of the Plague of Athens [2]. Other more recent 
examples include the black death in Europe that started in the 14th century and 
lasted for several centuries in an on and off manner, which lead to a high 
mortality rate of 20% or more in some episodes [3]. The 1918-1919 flu pandemic 
was the most devastating disease outbreak in the modern era with more than 50 
millions death around the world [4]. The list of global outbreaks is long and the 
outbreaks vary in severity and in their social and economic consequences.  
           The 21st century is no exception to history. Many global outbreaks have 
occurred over the last two decades such as SSRS, Mumps, the 2009 flu 
pandemic, MERS, Ebola, and others. The contemporary global situation provides 
ease of transportation, free markets policies, wide developmental gaps between 
regions and nation states, terrorism and potential international conflicts, 
availability of technologies for legal and illegal use, and other factors that make 
outbreak control more challenging.  
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           Strategies for fighting outbreaks are vary widely between different national 
healthcare systems according to wealth, sovereignty, and scientific capabilities. 
However, a failure of a local healthcare system is threatening not only to the local 
population but also to neighbors or the entire world population. Such a potential 
threat requires the international community to cooperate in the outbreak 
controlling process. International cooperation is not straightforward intervention. 
Reasons that making international intervention difficult include: 
1. Local systems may not able to accommodate international aid 
due to absence of basic infrastructure. 
2. Political sensitivity to allowing foreign intervention with 
possible unknown hidden agendas. 
3. Attitude of some poor countries to shift the cost of outbreak 
control to the international community. 
4. Advocacy weakness in the field of outbreak control especially 
when outbreaks emerge in poor countries.  
5. Absence of a specific international apparatus that collects and 
distributes aid. Despite the efforts of WHO and other 
international agencies, this kind of emergency may need a 
more robust apparatus. 
6. Absence of definition and criteria for global disease outbreaks 
that require international involvement. 
           International intervention needs to be legitimized in those countries 
requesting support or in those countries refusing to cooperate. The road to 
	  
3	  
	  
repairing international agencies or establishing a new international agency to 
serve global outbreak control starts with the definition of a global outbreak by 
efficient assessment tool. It is obvious that not all outbreaks need international 
involvement. However, public health globally does not have an efficient tool to 
determine if a severe outbreak requires international attention.  
Purpose of the capstone: 
           The purpose of this capstone is to develop a disease outbreak severity 
index. This index will be utilized to evaluate the virulence of the outbreak agent, 
transmissibility, characteristic of local population, performance of local health 
system, and other factors. The outbreak severity index is a dynamic tool that 
would serve in the evaluation of an outbreak early in its emergence and during 
the follow-up period. The score of outbreak severity index will be used in 
determination if the outbreak is severe enough to launch urgent protective 
measures and to advocate for external intervention.  
           Current global public health practices depend on mortality rates and other 
indices that are utilized by non-professional media for evaluation of disease 
outbreaks. Recent history has shown that global outbreaks may be affected by 
many factors that need to be taken in consideration. The goal of proposing such 
a measurement tool is to reach a global consensus that makes public health 
practice function at its highest capacity in order to enhance outbreak evaluation 
and control. The process of assessment tool development will require more 
evaluation prior to its adoption. However, this proposal aims to initiate the 
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process of thinking about the importance of an outbreak assessment tool 
whether this particular measurement tool is adopted or not. The outbreak severity 
index will require additional development to enhance its validity and reliability 
prior to its adoption.  
Statement of the problem: 
           Outbreaks as disasters that affect much larger sections of the population 
than most of common natural disasters have no unified or integrated assessment 
tools to measure the outbreak’s severity and that can be utilized to initiate an 
appropriate mitigation process. Global public health practices depend on different 
models of the assessment process taking social and political circumstances into 
consideration. Such circumstances may delay many preventive and assistance 
efforts. An outbreak severity index should fill   this gap in appreciation of such 
calamities.    
Overview of project process: 
           This capstone project is a descriptive study. Some of the global outbreaks 
that occurred in the last few years were selected to be reviewed; including SARS, 
MERS, and Ebola. These outbreaks were selected due to their global impact and 
because they occurred in different areas of the world with different healthcare 
systems. The review of these outbreaks was from public health perspective. The 
next step was to review the literature to identify the factors that lead to 
emergence and spread of each outbreak. Identification of important factors was 
followed by standardization of each factor. The last step was the development of 
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a scoring system for these factors (indices) and evaluating these three outbreaks 
according the new scoring system. The end result of this evaluation is a score 
that is associated with each outbreak to indicate its severity in a comprehensive 
and integrated manner.       
Scope and importance of the study: 
           The outbreak severity index is theoretically applicable for any outbreak. 
However, the assessment of an outbreak is a dynamic process and takes the 
evaluator’s prospective into consideration. It will take the process of outbreak 
evaluation to higher objective and a structural level. It is not a mathematical test, 
but rather an appropriate model that will unify global public health activists in 
asking for improved processes in dealing with outbreaks that threaten the lives of 
an uninformed population and direct assistance to where it is mostly needed. It 
would also limit the effect of political and diplomatic professionals dealing with 
such disasters.  
           The outbreak severity index is a new approach that should be adopted by 
the global public health community to gain credibility. This process will require 
additional studies and efforts to build a consensus for such a measurement tool. 
Testing the validity and reliability of the outbreak severity index is one of the main 
challenges. Some of indices of the outbreak severity index may carry greater 
importance than others to be counted as equal. However, the outbreak severity 
index is an integrative approach rather than a partial evaluative approach. 
Interpretation and availability of information may also be considered issues 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Description of recent global outbreaks:            
1- SARS:    
           Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was recognized in 
Guangdong Province in China in 2002 for the first time [5].  The first known case 
occurred in a physician from Guangdong Province, who after visiting his family in 
Hong Kong, was admitted to ICU with respiratory failure after five days of 
symptoms [6]. The infection spread to 30 countries around the world 
predominantly through air travel [7][8]. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
issued a global health alert in March 2003. By June 2004, 8,447 cases of SARS 
had been identified with 813 deaths (9.6 % mortality) [5].      
Symptoms:  
           SARS is predominantly a respiratory disease occurring as a form of 
atypical pneumonia [9]. The WHO defines suspected cases as a person with 
documented fever (temperature >38o), symptoms of lower respiratory tract 
infection, and contact with a SARS patient or patient with travel history to an area 
of documented transmission. However, a probable case was defined as a 
suspected case plus chest radiological findings of pneumonia or Acute 
Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS), or death from an unexplained 
respiratory illness with autopsy findings suggesting ARDS [9]. Fever was the 
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most common symptom at presentation, since all patients had a fever (>38o) at 
the time of presentation [10][11]. The fever could reach up to 40o [11]. Myalgia 
and weakness were also present in almost all patients. Dry cough and dyspnea 
were evident in most of the patients [11]. Other symptoms include headache, 
nausea, arthralgia, dizziness, chest pain, diarrhea, and sore throat [11]. Many 
patients were suffering also from anxiety and depression [10].  
Mode of transmission: 
           The spread of SARS was mainly person-to-person [12]. The route of 
transmission is through direct contact with the body’s mucus membranes with 
transmission by droplet or other fomites [13]. Transmission occurs when a 
person is exposed to a very ill SARS patient such as a family member or health 
care workers. Also intense exposure to a SARS patient in places such as 
airplanes or work places may carry the same hazards [13]. The arousals 
transmission such as the transmission of measles or influenza is another 
possibility. However, the reproduction number (R0) was three, which was more 
consistent with direct contact or a thick and large droplet mode of transmission 
[13]. Another important factor was the aerosolizing procedures occurring at 
hospitals that might increase the risk of transmission. Other modes of 
transmission such as the fecal-to-oral route were suspected since significant 
number of SARS patients had diarrhea. However, the possibility of environmental 
contamination as a transmission route was another challenging and interesting 
factor. A study in Hong Kong had used the spatial distribution of outbreak cases 
and modeling of airflow dynamics to investigate the possibility of airborne 
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transmission of SARS [14]. The study concluded that exposure to a common 
source is another possibility for transmission rather than person-to-person 
contact; the sewage system could be the common source. The study noted that 
security and shopping mall workers did not register a single infection. However, 
many residents in other units and buildings were infected early in the peak of the 
outbreak. 
           An animal reservoir was an important issue not only to determine the 
source but also to control the outbreak. The SARS-coronavirus was thought to be 
initiated from animal origin and recently crossed from these animal reservoirs to 
infect humans. However, many animals including the Chinese ferret-badger, 
beaver, domestic cat, hog badger, Himalayan palm civet, and raccoon dog from 
the live-animal market in Shenzhen were tested [15]. The study focused on these 
animals due to early reports indicating a higher incidence among restaurant 
workers handling wild mammals. The study succeeded in identifying SARS- like 
coronaviruses from the raccoon dog and palm civet that were genetically almost 
identical. The possibility of transmission could not be excluded. The study 
concluded that these animals might represent the intermediate host but not the 
natural reservoir. Bats have been identified as a reservoir for many coronavirus 
species [16]. However, the strain of coronavirus identified in the horseshow bat 
(Rhinolophus) suggested that bats in general were a natural reservoir for the 
SARS-like coronavirus despite the slight difference, which could be explained by 
recombination to increase genetic diversity and fitness [16].                   
Diagnosis: 
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           The diagnosis of SARS relies primarily on clinical suspicion [17]. The 
clinical features which suggesting the SARS diagnosis are numerous. However, 
the context of the outbreak’s time and place plays a significant role. Following the 
outbreak in Canada, a directive approached was proposed. A study of 273 
laboratory-confirmed SARS patients was conducted to explore the clinical 
manifestations and source of infection in Canada [17]. Exposure to ill patients in 
health care facilities occurred in 80% of confirmed cases followed by 17% in the 
household exposure to SARS patients. A history of travel was associated with 
only 3 of those exposed. Respiratory symptoms such as a cough and dyspnea 
were associated with less than 60% of confirmed cases. Pulmonary infiltrates 
and blood cell count abnormalities such as lymphopenia and thrombocytopenia 
at admission were associated with confirmed cases. Symptoms and signs of a 
common viral upper respiratory tract infection such as rhinorrhea and a sore 
throat were associated with excluded cases. The study concluded that in 
absence of a fever and a significant history of exposure, SARS was unlikely.  
           The incubation period for SARS is a maximum of 10 days [18]. However, it 
ranges from 2-10 days [19] and with a mean of 6-7 days [20]. This relatively long 
incubation period mandates an efficient and rapid means for early detection and 
diagnosis. Reverse Transcription- Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) is a 
mainstay diagnostic tool during the illness [20]. However, it is affected by the type 
of sample (plasma, nasogastric aspiration, stool, or other) and also by the viral 
load. The viral load is influenced by the replication activity of the virus in the 
affected tissue and tends to be more evident in the second week of illness, 
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making a false negative result significant concern. Testing SARS antibodies in a 
clinical sample could be used as a screening method especially after it was made 
available by the WHO. Enzyme Linked ImmunoSorbant Assay (ELISA) and 
Immunofluorescence Assay (IFA) are examples of the antibodies detection test. 
The limitations of these tests are their low negative predictive value and the fact 
that seroconversion happened late in the course of the disease [21]. Isolation of 
the virus is time consuming and not widely available.                    
Treatment: 
           The treatment strategy could be divided into drugs targeting the 
coronavirus itself through eradication or reducing its activity, reduction of the 
inflammatory response by the body, and/or by general supportive measures. 
Antiviral drugs were utilized to deactivate the coronavirus.  The usage of antiviral 
drugs may be more effective if it is utilized in the replicative phase before the 
damage occurred [22]. Ribavirin was chosen as the drug of choice due to its 
broad-spectrum activity against coronaviruses in general [23]. However, ribavirin 
did not show viral growth inhibition in laboratory tests with the dose commonly 
utilized [24]. Anemia and cardiac and liver toxicity were the major adverse side 
effects [25]. Protease inhibitors, another group of antiviral drugs, were tried. The 
combination of Lopinavir, and ritonavir were used, since they had shown efficacy 
against HIV due to synergistic characteristics [23]. This combination had better 
survival outcomes and lower side effects [26]. Reduction in the immunological 
response by corticosteroid was the second strategy during the 
immunopathological phase. SARS had shown a massive immunological 
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response that led to massive tissue damage [27]. Also, CT scan of SARS 
patients commonly demonstrated a Bronchiolitis obliterans organizing pneumonia 
(BOOP) [28], a condition that is characterized by bronchiolitis obstruction due to 
inflammation, which is responsive to corticosteroids. However, use of 
corticosteroids is almost always a controversial clinical issue. On the one hand, 
the use of corticosteroid would reduce the destructive immunological response, 
and on the other side reduce the body’s resistance to the invasive microbe and 
thus increase its activity and replication. Many corticosteroid regimens with high 
and low potent steroid were tried, but it seems that the use of corticosteroids 
would be dictated by the individual patient’s situation specially those approaching 
respiratory failure [23]. Convalescent plasma was also used with corticosteroids 
in many patients. The convalescent plasma is plasma that has been taken from 
recovered patients and then injected into sick patients to obtain the advantage 
from the antibodies that have been formed during the sickness of the donators. A 
retrospective study with a small group of patients produced a better outcome 
[29]. Intravenous immunoglobulin also has been utilized for very sick patients 
[30]. Supportive measures are those interventions that improve the general 
condition of the patient such as feeding, breathing, and circulation. SARS is 
mainly a respiratory disease and lung failure is the worse consequence that may 
lead to death. Securing efficient ventilation is crucial intervention used to prevent 
patient deterioration. Noninvasive positive pressure ventilation (no intubation) 
was shown to be effective in treating patients with acute respiratory failure and it 
was used particularly for health care workers [31]. However, due to fears of 
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spreading the infection by this aerosol procedure, it has been banned in some 
countries [23].  Invasive mechanical ventilation is the only choice when the 
patient has deteriorated and respiratory failure is evident. Other new treatment 
modalities such as interferon had been tried and shown some efficacy [32].       
Fatality: 
           Six months after the emergence of this novel disease, the WHO updated 
the fatality rate of SARS [18]. The overall fatality rate was estimated to be from 
14 to 15 %. However, this rate has a wide range from 0 to 50%. Age was the 
main factor affecting the fatality rate. In 24 year old or younger patients, the 
fatality was less than 1%, while in patients older than 64 years; the fatality rate 
was 50%. The presence of another disease was another determent factor.  
Differences occurred between health systems around the world. The Australian 
and American fatality rate was 0%. However, in Canada, China, and Hong Kong, 
fatality rates were around 15% [8].      
Prevention: 
           The transmissibility of SARS is much less than other viral diseases with 
respiratory transmission such as influenza. The reproductive number of single 
SARS case was estimated to be around 3 cases in the presence of control efforts 
[33]. However, in the absence of specific control methods, SARS can spread 
much more widely. Early identification of cases, tracing of contacts, isolation, and 
quarantine are the crucial control strategies. The ideal control method would be 
the development of an effective vaccine, which has not been achieved [34].           
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          In March 2003, WHO issued an emergency travel advisory [35], composed 
of general instructions about direct contact with SARS patients. In April 2003, 
WHO issued another advisory, advising postponement of travel to Hong Kong, 
Beijing and Shanxi Province in China and to Toronto, Canada [36]. In July 2003, 
WHO lifted this restrictive advisory [37].  
           Legislative effort was used in some countries to enforce the commitment 
to the quarantine individuals at home. Singapore issued the Infectious Disease 
Act, which prohibited breaking home quarantine [38]. Schools were also closed 
and all other public gatherings were postponed. Home quarantine was strict and 
was under continuous surveillance by cameras installed in homes. Passengers 
were screened at airports. Taiwan established a number of military facilities to 
serve as locations for isolation [38]. The definition of a SARS case was expanded 
early in the outbreak due to uncertainty concerning SARS. This expansion of the 
definition led to unnecessarily isolation [39]. In addition, restriction on personal 
movement and traveling between different districts was utilized as a potential 
way to reduce the spread of the outbreak [33].  
           Healthcare workers were the group most affected by the SARS outbreak 
and protection of this group was vital not only for it, but also for the community 
being served. N95-mask wearing, gloves and gowns, and hand washing were the 
main precautionary measures used by healthcare workers, which demonstrated 
their protective advantages [40]. Other strict surveillance approaches for 
healthcare workers were implemented.  Streamlined workflow at hospitals and 
fever screening twice a day were examples for these measures [41]. Extra 
	  
14	  
	  
precautions were applied for some healthcare workers, such as 
anesthesiologists, who were involved in invasive procedure [42].    
2- MERS:   
            Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS CoV) was diagnosed first in 
the United Kingdom in September 2012 for a Qatari patient transferred by air 
ambulance from an ICU in a Qatari hospital. The virus was given the name of 
Novel Coronavirus (nCoV). It was compared with another coronavirus that was 
almost identical isolated from the lungs of Saudi patient who died in the 
Netherlands [43]. The WHO thought that this novel virus was different from 
SARS and was concerned about the coming season of pilgrimage (Hajj) as a 
serious opportunity for the virus to spread [44]. Two weeks after the first case 
was identified, WHO failed to find any evidence of human-to-human transmission 
[45]. Six weeks later in November 2012, four cases were reported from Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar in which two were family members [46]. In May 2013, the name 
of disease was changed to MERS-CoV, with a total of 44 patients mainly in Saudi 
Arabia being identified [46].  
Symptoms: 
            MERS-CoV is mainly a respiratory disease. Despite the severity of this 
disease, it has been thought that it is a part of wide spectrum of symptomatology 
including a much milder form. Some patients did not require admission and some 
did not have respiratory symptoms initially [47]. In a study of 47 patients in Saudi 
Arabia, 98% had fever and fever was the most prominent feature [47]. However, 
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in other studies including 70 patients in Saudi Arabia, fever occurred in only 61% 
[48]. Cough, shortness of breath, and chest pain were present in the majority of 
patients [47]. Other symptom such as hemoptysis, headache, and myalgia were 
present in some patients. Gastrointestinal symptoms such as diarrhea, nausea, 
and vomiting were also evident in some patients and were the initial symptoms in 
the case that occurred in France [47].  
           The majority (89%) of patients required mechanical ventilation. Also, the 
majority (96%) of patients had comorbid diseases [47]. In the first cluster 
outbreak in Al-Hasa, Saudi Arabia, the median incubation period was 5.2 days 
and majority of patients had an incubation period of 12.4 days [47]. 
Thrombocytopenia and lymphopenia, hematological abnormalities, were 
identified in almost one third of the patients. Also, Liver enzyme abnormalities 
were identified in less than half of the patients. Almost all patients had abnormal 
chest radiographic studies [43].                    
Mode of transmission: 
           MERS-CoV has been isolated from camels in many Middle Eastern 
countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, and Oman. The close relationship 
between the geographical area of these animals and rate of disease occurrence 
was linked. It had been shown that people working in close contact with camels 
are at higher risk of infection with this novel virus [49]. Other animals such as 
goats, cows, sheep, water buffalo, swine and wild birds were tested for this virus 
with negative results [45]. However, a close strain of MERS beta-coronavirus 
was isolated from bats in South Africa [50]. It is interesting that less than 40% of 
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MERS patients reported contact with camels [51]. Also, most of infections among 
camels are asymptomatic or occur with mild respiratory symptoms. These facts 
make speculation of widespread infection among camels not only in the Arabian 
peninsula but even to Africa a significant concern [51]. Human-to-human 
transmission was limited to family members and healthcare workers, which made 
the assumed transmission route to be difficult between humans [52]. The role of 
secondary transmission in household with MERS was very limited, and estimated 
to be approximately 5% [53].       
Diagnosis: 
           The WHO recommends collection of specimens from the upper and lower 
respiratory tracts. However, collection of sera should be performed in the first 14 
days after disease onset [54]. Real Time-Reverse Transcription Polymerase 
Chain Reaction (qRT-PCR) is the main method to diagnose the disease among 
patients [50]. qRT-PCR has to be detected in at least two specific targeted 
genomes to be considered positive. However, serological tests are available that 
are mainly used for screening purposes. ELISA, or enzyme-linked 
ImmunoSorbant assay is the first test in the series of serological tests utilized. 
Positive ELISA should be confirmed by immunofluorescence assay (IFA), or by 
microneutralization assay [55].  
           The clinical picture and contact history should determine the need for 
screening. However, WHO defines a confirmed case as a patient with 
confirmatory laboratory test regardless of the clinical picture [56]. A probable 
case is one with suggestive for pneumonia or acute respiratory distress, and a 
	  
17	  
	  
history of travel to the Middle East or a history of contact with a confirmed case of 
MERS [56]. However, other studies suggested that the onset of the disease 
would occur after two days of arrival from the Middle East unless a strong history 
of contact to MERS patient had occurred [57].       
Treatment: 
           The treatment of MERS should begin early when suspicion of MERS is in 
the list differential diagnosis. The clinical features that suggest severe pneumonia 
or acute respiratory distress syndrome with no other explanation should be 
treated seriously as MERS. The first measure is the isolation of the patient with 
droplet precautions. Supportive measures such as oxygen and fluid therapy are 
the mainstay of treatment. WHO recommends prompt oxygen therapy that can 
be administered through invasive or noninvasive procedures. Clinicians should 
not hesitate to start mechanical ventilation to insure a good blood oxygen level 
[58]. Also, antibiotics are recommended until the diagnosis of MERS is confirmed 
[58]. Antiviral therapy, such as ribavirin and oseltamivir is not beneficial [58]. 
However, a combination of interferon and ribavirin was thought to have 
therapeutic and prophylactic effects [59][60]. Although ribavirin may produce the 
best outcome, the high prevalence of toxicity such hemolysis limits its use [61].      
Fatality: 
           In January 5, 2015, the total incidence of MERS cases was 828 cases 
[62]. The total number of deaths was 357, representing a 43% mortality rate. The 
mortality rate was 21% in United Arab Emirates [63]. Despite the increase in the 
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incidence of MERS in 2014, the mortality rate decreased from 60%, a rate 
reported by WHO in mid 2013 [64].         
Prevention: 
           The MERS outbreak has been dealt with mainly by containment, since 
there is neither an effective vaccination nor a specific treatment. Containment is 
centered on isolating infected patients in order to break the transmission cycle, 
which involves no other mode of transmission such as zoonotic transmission. 
CDC recommends the use of an airborne infection control room as the gold 
standard for treatment; otherwise, the patient should wear a facemask. 
Adherence to Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) should be strictly required 
especially during aerosol procedures such as intubation or tracheal lavage 
specimen collection [65]. A containment strategy among contacts is another 
important factor to limit the spread of this outbreak. Strict recommendations were 
proposed for health workers who were exposed to MERS patients especially 
those who did not wear PPE. Medical evaluation, and immediately stopping work 
are part of these recommendations. Also, screening and education of visitors 
were recommended [65].    
3-Ebola: 
           Ebola is one of the viral hemorrhagic fever diseases. The present 
outbreak in West Africa is not the first Ebola outbreak, which has been preceded 
by several others; the first known outbreak was in 1976 in Sudan and Zaire. 
However, other less significant outbreaks occurred in the late seventies of the 
last century in Sudan, and Zaire. In 1990, the few asymptomatic cases identified 
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in the United States, were attributed to monkeys imported from Philippines. In 
1994, Gabon was stricken by an Ebola outbreak, and outbreaks were discovered 
between 1995-1996 in Gabon, Congo, and the Ivory Coast. Also, many 
laboratory incidents occurred in England, Italy, and Russia during the same 
period. Ebola was undetected until another series of significant outbreaks was 
identified in Uganda, Republic of Congo, and South of Sudan between 2000 and 
2004. Another wave of outbreaks occurred between 2007 and 2009 in the same 
West African countries. Succeeding outbreaks were limited and controlled in 
these countries until the disastrous outbreak of March 2014 in Guinea, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone. This outbreak was accompanied by a relatively limited 
outbreak in Central Africa in the Democratic Republic Of Congo [66]. To date, the 
2014 outbreak in West Africa is the most severe and long-lasting Ebola outbreak 
[67].  
           The Ebola virus is a single-strand RNA virus belonging to Filoviridae 
family, which contains Ebolavirus, Lloviu virus, and Marburgvirus. The Ebola 
virus has been divided into five strains according to genetic and antigenic 
properties: Sudan (EBOV-S), Zaire (EBOV-Z), Tai Forest (EBOV-TF), Reston 
(EBOV-R) and Bundibugyo (EBOV-B) [67]. 
Symptoms: 
          The clinical manifestations are similar to those of viral hemorrhagic fever. 
Generalized weakness was the most prominent clinical feature, occurring in 80% 
of the patients followed by fever in 78% of patients [68]. The clinical features may 
vary depending on the strain of the Ebola virus causative the infection [67]. Also, 
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the clinical features and outcomes differ according to the level of viremia. The 
non-survivor tend to have 100-1000 folds of viremia when compared to the 
survivors [69]. The clinical manifestations were divided into three phases: (1) 
Early onset, which presents similarly to influenza. (2) Involvement of the 
gastrointestinal tract. (3) The late stage is characterized by hemorrhage, multiple 
organ failure, and rapid clinical decline [70]. In the early stage fever, chills, and 
myalgia are the main symptoms. Lethargy, cough, headache, anorexia, diarrhea, 
abdominal pain, vomiting, and hypotension follow these symptoms [69]. . 
Hemorrhagic symptoms do not always occur and it was observed in only 26% of 
patients in an Ebola treatment center in Conakry [68]. Hemorrhagic 
manifestations include bruising, epistaxis, bleeding from venipuncture sites, and 
bleeding from the gastrointestinal and urinary tracts [69]. Tachypnea, shock, and 
coma are the hallmarks of the late stage along with imminent death and massive 
necrosis in many organs such as the liver, spleen, and kidneys [69].                        
Mode of transmission: 
           The early Ebola outbreak was thought to be transmitted by unsafe 
injections in Zaire in 1976 [71]. However, the major route is the exposure to the 
Ebola virus through mucosal surfaces, abrasions or injuries to the skin, or 
parental transmission [72]. The transmission of Ebola tends to occur more often 
in the late stage of the disease than during the incubation period and 
asymptomatic patients pose little threat of transmission [73]. During the outbreak 
in Uganda in 2000-2001, contact with patient’s fluids had the strongest 
association with development of the disease. However, physical contact with 
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patients was associated with transmission of the disease more often than 
touching deceased patients. Also, sleeping on the same mat and participating in 
hand washing during funeral ceremonies were associated with transmission of 
the disease [74]. Another study carried out in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
during the 1995 outbreak demonstrated almost the same pattern of transmission. 
An increment of risk ratio was observed for those exposed to infected patients 
during the late stage of the disease. The greatest contact risk occurred by 
touching patients [75]. The aerosol pathway is another potential route of 
transmission, which was documented in an animal experimental model [76].  
            Tracing of transmission routes is complicated by the fact that 
asymptomatic individuals are present. Individuals who were exposed to an ill 
patient and did not develop symptoms were identified in Gabon in 1996. A study 
of 24 individuals with close patient contact found that 11 had a positive 
immunological test for Ebola [77]. Also, Ebola virus antibodies were found in 
asymptomatic individuals inhabiting the tropical forests of the Central African 
Republic. The prevalence of positive antibodies was more evident in hunter-
gathers than in farmers [78].  
           The reproductive number (R0) is the “average of number of successful 
offspring that the organism is capable of producing, in the absence of crowding 
and other density-dependent effects” [79]. It takes in consideration that everyone 
is susceptible regardless of other factors. The R0 was estimated to be 2.7 from 
the two outbreaks in Africa in 1995 and 2000 [73]. The disease reservoir raises 
an interesting question despite knowing that the reservoir is less important than 
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understanding the dynamic of transmission [79]. The examination of carcasses of 
wild animals, which was performed between 2001 and 2003 in Gabon and 
Republic of Congo, found positive serological evidences that gorillas, 
chimpanzees, and duikers had been infected by the Ebola virus [80]. Another 
survey of the Ebola virus, which was performed in Cameron, Gabon, and 
Republic of Congo, estimated the seroprevalence rate among wild chimpanzees 
to be 12.9% [81].  The presence of this rate among wild animals suggests a form 
of non-lethal disease. However, deaths among certain species such as gorillas 
and chimpanzees were attributed to infection with Ebola, which was considered 
as the source of outbreaks in Central Africa [82]. These deaths resulted in an 
effort to find the real reservoir in wild species. Following the outbreak in 
Democratic Republic of Congo in 1995, 3066 vertebrates were tested for the 
Ebola virus (Zaire subtype). The selection of these animals was based on 
exposure history and the presence of animals in a specific habitat. The result 
was negative [83]. More than 400 bats among other animals were tested in 
Democratic Republic of Congo at the site of 1976 outbreak, and it failed to 
demonstrate any evidence of Ebola antibodies [84]. However, in an incremental 
inoculation of Ebola virus a variety of species including fruit and insectivorous 
bats, bats supported the replication and circulation of a high titer of the virus [85]. 
1390 bats from different species were collected between 2003 and 2006 from 
endemic and non-endemic areas in Gabon and Democratic Republic of Congo, 
demonstrating that 5% of these bats were infected. That rate declined to 1% 
following the outbreak, indicating a role of bats in transmission of the virus [86]. 
	  
23	  
	  
Fruit bats were tested in West Africa and followed by fitting with a radio 
transmitter. After 13 months, the infected bats demonstrated long-term survival 
[87].                                           
Diagnosis: 
           Ebola is a disease that shares many clinical symptoms with other 
diseases such as typhoid fever and malaria especially in the endemic area. 
Clinical suspicion of suggestive symptoms and travel history is crucial in the 
diagnostic process. The main limitation of many specific diagnostic tools is that 
they are unable to detect the virus before the onset of symptoms, which makes 
them useless as screening tools [88]. There are many specific diagnostic tools 
for Ebola hemorrhagic fever. Antigen-capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent 
assay (ELISA) testing, IgM ELISA, Reverse Transcription-Polymerase Chain 
Reaction (RT-PCR), Virus isolation, IgM and IgG antibodies, and 
immunohistochemistry testing are examples of these specific tools [89]. Viral 
isolation is the gold standard diagnostic tool. However, this procedure poses a 
very high level of hazard. It is also very difficult and needs a high level of 
expertise and technology. The shipment of infected specimens from endemic 
areas to well-developed laboratories demands safety procedures and certain 
important requirements such as cool chain. Electron microscopy is fast and 
sensitive especially when aggregated with immunological antigen. It can examine 
many types of specimen such as serum, a thin section of the infected material, 
and cultural fluid. The main limitation is the cost and level of expertise required. A 
minimum number of viruses to be visualized is also a limitation. Antigen-capture 
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ELISA is specific diagnostic tool. Animal antibodies, which can be used for 
antigenic capture, have been developed for many Ebola virus strains. ELISA is 
under development and appears to be a very promising diagnostic tool. Currently 
the most widely used diagnostic tool is the real-time RT-PCR due to its simplicity 
and sensitivity. It is more specific than ELISA especially when specific dye is 
used. Obtaining the results of the RT-PCR test takes about 2-3 hours. With the 
development of specific premiers and props, RT-PCR is the test of choice to 
confirm the diagnosis. Continuous mutation and emergence of a new viral strain 
may be a source of concern regarding the diagnostic use of RT-PCR [90].     
Treatment: 
           Currently, there is no standard of treatment and the treatment occurs 
mainly through the use of supportive measures [91]. CDC recommends fluid and 
electrolyte replacement, maintenance of blood pressure and oxygen status, and 
treatment of secondary infections as supportive measures [92].    
           Antibody therapy was tried in 1995 during the outbreak in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Plasma from Ebola survivors were transfused to eight 
infected patients, half of them complaining of hemorrhagic manifestations. Only 
one of these eight patients died, a death rate much lower than that seen in 
previous outbreaks, which was 80% [93]. This plasma transfusion procedure 
contains clotting factors beside the antibodies, which could reduce the severity of 
hemorrhage [94]. However, the sample size was very small. Plasma transfusion 
carries the hazards of transfusion reaction and transmission of other pathogens. 
Monoclonal immunoglobulin G (IgG) was tried in animals. Six monkeys were 
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treated with equine IgG and showed a limited beneficial effect in viral load and 
delay of death [95]. Other trials of single monoclonal antibodies were 
unsuccessful; however, they lead to the concept of a cocktail of multiple 
monoclonal antibodies therapy [94]. Two IgG were administered in monkeys 
before and after inoculation of Ebola virus, showing protective benefits before the 
decline of circulating IgG [96]. This procedure indicated the need to prolong the 
half-life of antibodies. Unlike in the case for Ebola patients, it was administered 
before the infection. New generations of cocktail antibody therapy such as ZMAb 
and MB-003 were introduced in animal models. MB-003 had shown a protective 
effect approaching 70% when injected on the first day after inoculation [97]. 
However, ZMAb showed 100% protection when administered 24 hours after 
inoculation and 50% when administered 48 hours after inoculation [98]. ZMaap is 
a promising treatment for infected animals with a specific combination of IgG 
from ZMAb and MB-003, demonstrating 100% protection. The promising factor is 
that ZMaap was administered in animals after the appearance of symptoms such 
as fever, abnormal blood counts, and hemorrhage [99]. These animal trials 
occurred with small sample sizes and no randomized controlled clinical trials 
have been conducted. 
           Antiviral drugs are another treatment strategy. In addition to its side 
effects profile, ribavirin did not show activity against the Ebola virus [100], and 
Lamivudine did not show a decrease in mortality in Ebola patients [91].  
Favipiravir, a new and promising drug, is a broad-spectrum antiviral drug, 
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developed in Japan for influenza. It has demonstrated100% protection against 
aerosol Ebola in an animal model [101].          
Fatality: 
           By January 23, 2015, the total number of confirmed cases of Ebola was 
13,602 with a total of 21,797 cases including non-confirmed cases in Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The total number of deaths was 8,675 (64%) [102]. 
The outbreak in Central Africa was limited and is considered to be over. The 
mortality rate differs among these countries with a rate of 40% in Sierra Leone, 
60% in Guinea, and 70% in Liberia [103]. Over time the fatality rate changed 
from a fatality rate of 47.7% to one of 31.5% [104]. The total number of cases 
was less than 2000 in any of the three countries in West Africa in October 2014. 
However, by end of January 2015, the total number of confirmed cases 
increased to approximately 11,000 in Sierra Leone, approximately 9,000 in 
Liberia, and 3000 in Guinea. The fatality rate in the previous outbreaks starting in 
1976, with the exclusion of outbreaks that had single patient, had a wide range 
from 15% to 88% [66].   
Prevention: 
           According to WHO, the incubation period is estimated to be between 2 
and 21 days [105]. However, the incubation period appears to have shorter 
range. In a study in Sierra Leone, the estimated incubation period was 6 to 12 
days [106]. Another larger study conducted in Guinea estimated the average 
incubation period to be 11.4 days [107].  
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           Vaccination against Ebola could be a significant step in the containment 
strategy. However, there is no approved vaccine available. There are two 
candidate vaccines, cAD3 and rVSV [108]; cAD3 vaccine is in phase 1 trials and 
rVSV has shown  protection against lethal infection of the virus in non-human 
primates [91]. In the absence of an effective vaccine, CDC recommends the 
following: 
§ Avoidance of contact with blood and body fluids. 
§ Avoidance handling items that may have come in contact with 
an infected person’s blood or body fluids. 
§ Avoidance of contact with bats and nonhuman primates or 
blood, fluids, and raw meat prepared from these animals. 
§ After you return, monitor your health for 21 days and seek 
medical care immediately in case of Ebola symptoms have 
developed [109].  
 Common Criteria of Outbreaks: 
           The last decade raised the challenge of the new outbreaks that were 
difficult to treat and to contain. WHO defines outbreak as an “occurrence of 
cases of disease in excess of what would normally be expected in a defined 
community, geographical area or season” [110]. An outbreak is not defined by a 
specific number of cases; rather by the presence of an increased number of 
cases in a specific time and place. 
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           Outbreaks have many factors that lead to their emergence. The Institute 
of Medicine Committee on Emerging Microbial Threats to Health in the 21st 
Century explored some of these factors [111]. The committee proposed a model 
of four factors interacting to produce an outbreak, including:  
1. Genetic and biological factors. 
2. Physical environmental factors. 
3. Ecological factors. 
4. Social, political, and economic factors. 
           These factors serve as fundamental factors that interact together in 
different intensities and directions. However, based on this model, the report 
proposed the following factors that are associated with one or more of these 
fundamental factors: 
• Microbial adaptation and change:  
   Microbes are widely present in the ecosystem. The relationship 
between humans and microbes are not always a threat, but in many 
instances beneficial to both parties [112]. Adaptation and change is a 
continuous process that assists in the survival of microbes according to 
the environment in which they live. One of the important examples is the 
influenza virus, which changes in each cycle of emergence. Such a 
change mandates a change in vaccine every year. The adaptation could 
be a result of genetic mutation or inclusion of new segments of DNA or 
RNA. Despite the limited size of the viral genome, the plasticity of this 
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genome to accommodate new segments and expand or shrink is evident 
in the RNA virus [113]. This accommodation could result in new genera 
with different characteristics. On the other hand, bacteria have many 
known ways of acquisition of new genetic material, including 
transformation, transduction, and conjugation [114]. Adaptation and 
change are vital methods for prokaryotic cells to survive. However, the 
changes accompanied by acquisition of new genetic material could be 
devastating to the host. 
   Coronavirus in general has undergone a similar genetic adaptation 
making them pathological to humans. No new major changes in the 
indigenous population in the consumption of or contact with the 
suspected animals were observed or reported before the emergence of 
SARS or MERS in East Asia or the Arabian Peninsula respectively. 
Ebola on other hand has a more interesting history. More than ten major 
outbreaks have occurred in Africa with different fatality rates and different 
viral strains. The adaptation process should not be ignored when trying 
to understand the variability in each outbreak.            
• Human susceptibility to infection: 
   According to the IOM report, many factors such as impaired host 
immunity, genetic polymorphism, aging, and malnourishment contribute to 
human susceptibility to infection. Human immunity is a very complex 
process and it is composed of physical and chemical barriers. The 
immune response after passing these physical and chemical barriers is 
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composed of cell-mediated and humoral-mediated responses, both of 
which are subject to regulation that is affected by previous exposure to 
any specific microbes. Genetic polymorphism such as that in sickle cell 
anemia or thalassemia is believed to be a protective adaptation to specific 
exposure to malaria. The genetic adaptation makes specific populations 
less susceptible to certain infections. Malnutrition is associated with a 
higher susceptibility to infection. The reverse relationship may also be true 
in which an infection that causes diarrhea as an example may lead to 
malnutrition.              
• Climate and weather: 
   The weather plays an important role in the transmission process that 
involves vectors, animal reservoirs, microbes, and humans. There are 
many physical elements included in changes of the weather such as 
drought, rainfall, temperature, flood, wildfire, earthquakes, and others. The 
interaction of these elements at each level of the transmission cycle is 
different, and may lead to different outcomes. It has been predicted that 
influenza cases, as an example would be more prevalent in specific 
seasons than in others due to weather changes.    
• Change in ecosystem:  
   Environmental changes generally affect the pathogen and the host. 
Currently, ecology is changing at a rapid pace due to many factors such 
as global warming, forest loss, and other factors. These ecological 
changes will promote change in the population characteristics of the 
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pathogens and human exposure to them. Also, ecological change in the 
form of weather changes such as drought and increased rainfall would 
affect the abundance of vectors that transmit diseases and would lead to a 
different intensity of exposure. Although the ecological changes would 
affect a limited area; the effect of that change would have a widespread 
global effect. Aedes aegypti mosquito, which causes yellow fever and 
dengue fever, is an example of the change introduced to the New World 
through slave ships.            
• Economic development and land use: 
   Consumption of natural resources, deforestation, dam building, and 
other expansion projects in nature have led to increased contact between 
human and animal reservoirs. This change in land use by humans has 
resulted in the emergence of new outbreaks. Lyme disease in North 
America has been linked to reforestation in Northeastern and Midwestern 
USA, leading to an increase in the population of white-tailed dear, the 
definitive host of vector ticks. Another example is Schistosomiasis 
occurring after building dams in Senegal and Egypt for agricultural and 
industrial purposes.              
• Human demographics and behavior: 
   The demography of any given population plays a crucial role in the rate 
and susceptibility of infection. The IOM report includes four main factors 
that led to this increase in susceptibility due to demographic factors. Aging 
is one such factor. The world population is growing older due to success in 
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controlling many acute and chronic diseases and applying safety 
measures in many aspects of life. The physiological changes that 
accompany aging such as decreased capability of the immune system and 
reduction of gastric secretion makes aging people more prone to infection. 
The aging phenomenon is worldwide, but the developed countries 
represent 77% of the gain in the elderly population. Urbanization is 
another important demographic factor. There is a trend toward   rural 
migration to cities in this century. 40 % the growth in the world’s cities is 
due to migration from rural areas. Urbanization is more evident in the 
developed countries where 75% of the population lives in the cities. The 
influx of people into cities was poorly accommodated due to poor 
infrastructure and living arrangements. Overcrowded houses and living in 
a less developed part of the cities might be the only choice for the new 
migrants due to the cost of living. Living in such circumstances in addition 
to lower economic security may drive the new migrants to be exposed to 
higher risk behaviors such as commercial sex. Also, lower accessibility to 
clean water and sanitation may aggravate their living situation. Ease of 
transportation between rural and urban centers has been correlated with 
the ease of transmitting infections. An increase in the number of immune-
compromised individuals is another demographic risk factor. Medical 
advances in treating patients with illnesses such as cancer or HIV has 
contributed to this increase. Also, using drugs that reduce immunity, as a 
treatment modality for some diseases is another way to produce an 
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immune-compromised population. The problem of having a significant 
immune-compromised population occurs not only due to their 
susceptibility to infection, but also due to the emergence of opportunistic 
infections and drug-resistant organisms. The fourth demographic factor is 
health behavior, which is affected by many factors including the social 
norm, education, economic status, age, and others. Sex behavior and illicit 
drug use are the main risk behaviors, which correlate with the 
community’s demography.                 
• Technology and industry: 
   Technological advancement in the medical, food safety, sanitation, and 
other arenas has led to eradication or reduction in the rate of many 
diseases. On other hand, the same technological advancement has also 
led to emergence of other diseases. Legionella in air-conditioning 
systems, E. Coli in animal husbandry practices, and toxic shock syndrome 
with tampons are examples of diseases that emerged with technological 
advancement. The wide use of antibiotics in animal husbandry and 
aquaculture to enhance production is correlated to the development of 
drug resistant bacteria. Many tools that have been developed due to the 
advancement of healthcare; such as endotracheal tubes, catheters, 
prosthetic heart valves, and hemodialysis machines, were considered to 
be vehicles for the transmission of many diseases. This problem of 
transmission of diseases was also increased by other advancements in 
medical procedures such as blood transfusion and organ transplant.            
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• International travel and commerce:  
   Contemporary modalities of transportation have increased the average 
spatial mobility of humans. The ease of mobility exposes people to each 
other more often than previously. This exposure theoretically enhances 
the transmission of a disease outbreak. Modern air travel has increased 
the rate and speed of travel by individuals. Airplanes, ships, and trains are 
closed areas that contribute to the transmission process. Influenza, 
tuberculosis, measles, and many other infectious diseases have been 
linked to air travel. The increase in international commerce has resulted in 
70% of the fruits and vegetables that are consumed in the United State 
coming from developing countries. Poultry, fish, and livestock are imported 
at different rates. The introduction of food from outside a country’s borders 
introduces a significant amount of parasites, microbes, snails, and other 
transmission vectors. Not only living organisms, but also pathological 
substances such prions in the case of cow-madness disease.                    
• The breakdown of public health measures: 
   Adequate sanitation and hygiene, Immunization programs, control of 
vector-born and zoonotic diseases, and public health legislation and 
enforcement were the main indicators of a quality public health system 
according to The IOM report. Adequate sanitation and clean drinking 
water were the main methods to control such diseases as cholera. 
Underdeveloped public health measures are not specific to developing 
countries. The advancement in medical technology and the survival of a 
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more elderly population and immune-compromised patients were not 
accompanied by robust public measures that would control nosocomial 
infections. Nosocomial infection is a leading cause of death in the USA. 
Immunization has proven its efficacy and has been considered one of the 
major public health achievements. However, due to a number reasons; 
such as, the cost or the perception of safety of a vaccine, vaccination for a 
variety of disease is in difficult. These difficulties are significant in the case 
of wars or famines. The application of public health practices to some 
programs in order to control diseases, as the use of Directly Observed 
Therapy (DOT) to control TB, have shown efficacy. Also public health 
interventions in the control of vector-born and zoonotic disease such as 
the use of pesticides are important programs of the public health system. 
Shortfalls in these interventions have been correlated to the increase in 
vector-borne diseases. Public health police powers such as quarantine 
and isolation are an important intervention in many disease outbreaks. 
Failure of the public health system is devastating and can contribute in the 
spread of outbreaks.               
• Poverty and social inequality: 
   Poverty affects accessibility to healthcare services. Low accessibility to 
healthcare, poverty and social inequality have been linked to the 
emergence to a number of infectious diseases such as TB. Education, 
housing, infrastructure, and the absence of social agencies are examples 
of factors that contribute in the emergence of disease outbreaks. 
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Privatization of state owned services and foreign influx of capital have 
contributed to financial crises in many countries. Poor countries are more 
sensitive to global economic fluctuation. Globalization and privatization 
have had a negative impact on the accessibility of healthcare in many 
under-developed countries.       
• War and famine: 
   The linkage between wars and the emergence of disease outbreaks is 
evident. Public health systems among other state and community-based 
systems are vulnerable to failure during wars. War and famine cannot be 
separated in most occasions. Battlefield casualties and the direct 
destructive consequences of war are not the entire story. The 
displacement of people forcing them to live in refugee camps with little or 
no infrastructure, clean water, sewage systems, sufficient food, and or 
healthcare creates a suitable place for outbreaks to emerge.           
• Lack of political will: 
   A disease outbreak is an exceptional situation that requires mobilization 
of resources to contain it. Political will is pivotal for such mobilization. 
Willingness means shifting available resources from other demands to the 
battle against the disease outbreak. It also means cooperation with local 
stakeholders such as the local population and private organizations to 
achieve containment of the outbreak. Not only domestic authorities, but 
also international cooperation is a key component of success. Since many 
outbreaks involve more than a country or world region, sensitivity to 
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international cooperation due to sovereignty or other reasons could 
theoretically affect the control of outbreaks.          
• Intent to harm:  
   Biological weapons are serious threats. Despite the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC), non-state producers add another difficulty in the 
control of such threats. The IOM report pointed to the fact that civilian 
scientists are unfamiliar with the nature of this threat. This unfamiliarity 
concerning biological weapons may contribute to the lack of awareness of 
their devastating effects. The introduction of microbes could occur by a 
variety of means such as direct inoculation and infecting vectors or 
reservoirs. Terrorism and technologic advancement make this threat a real 
concern.          
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
In Chapter 2, the three examples of recent outbreaks require a better 
definition of disease outbreaks that require an international intervention. In this 
Chapter, a scoring system will be proposed, composed of ten indices and totaling 
ten points. A score of 10 will be considered the most dangerous score, 
mandating a prompt intervention, while 0 would not mandate any intervention by 
the international community. Each index would represent one point on a 10-point 
scale. The severity of each outbreak would be determined by comparing different 
disease outbreaks.    
Index 1: Novelty of the disease agent: 
           Outbreaks are caused by a wide variety of microbial agents. Virus, 
bacteria, and fungi are not the only cause of disease outbreaks, but other 
contagious material such as prions or unsafe exposure to chemicals or radiation 
may be causes. Ambiguity and obscurity of the causative agent is a challenging 
factor in the control and containment of outbreaks. When a public health system 
is faced with an unknown disease with an unknown cause, it is difficult to control 
that outbreak and interdict its transmission cycle. The assumption here is that 
efforts would be exerted to identify the causative pathogen. The scoring system 
is dynamic and can change from time to time during the outbreak. An outbreak 
with an unknown etiology should become known as soon as possible. The 
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purpose of the scoring system is to evaluate the outbreak at any time during the 
outbreak.  
           With new technology such as the electronic microscope, PCR, and viral 
culture, identification of the pathogen may occur within a very short period of 
time. However, the identification of the pathogenic agent (microbe) is the first 
step but not the last. There are other important factors that would reveal an 
obscure pathogenic agent. These factors include knowledge about the reservoir, 
mode of transmission, incubation period, and availability of diagnostic methods. 
In this index, there are five questions/factors that determine the novelty of the 
disease agent: 
I. Is the causative agent known? 
II. Is the source or the reservoir of that agent known? 
III. Is the mode of transmission known? 
IV. Is the incubation period known? 
V. Is there any known diagnostic procedure? 
           This index deals primarily with the knowledge of stakeholders about the 
threat that they are facing. The answer of each question is YES or NO. There 
may be difficulty knowing how much the stakeholders know about any one of 
these questions. In case there is partial knowledge such as knowing some fact 
about the mode of transmission but not the full picture, should this question be 
considered yes or no based on knowing the mode of transmission? The answer 
to this question should be left to the evaluating team. If the evaluating team 
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determines that the picture is clear enough to be considered in the plan of 
outbreak control, the answer should be yes. Otherwise, the answer is no when 
the team finds insufficient information concerning the cycle of transmission and 
clarity does not exist as to how to break the cycle in the effort to control the 
outbreak. The same principle will be applied to the other questions. 
           The Index Score is calculated by assigning 0.2 for each question with a 
NO answer. A total of 1 point is added to the total score when the investigators 
do not know the causative agent, the source/reservoir of the causative agent, the 
mode of transmission, the incubation period, and the absence/ unawareness of 
diagnostic tools. Thus, the total score would be 0 when the five questions had 
YES answers for each of them. This means that investigators are aware of the 
causative agent, the source/reservoir of the causative agent, the mode of 
transmission, the incubation period, and the presence/awareness of various 
diagnostic tools.    
           Identification of causative agent is a crucial step that leads to 
understanding the other properties of an outbreak. Sometimes the clinical 
situation suggests a specific agent/microbe; i.e., salmonella food poising, Ebola, 
malaria, and others. However, sometimes the causative agent may be unknown 
at least in the beginning of the outbreak. SARS, and MERS are good examples 
of this kind of outbreak. The evaluating team should consider both situations and 
answer the first question accordingly. The scoring process is a dynamic process 
and the point at which scoring occurs may change following any newly confirmed 
result in the identification process.   
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           The identification of a reservoir or source of infection may be more difficult 
than the identification of the causative agent. MERS and Ebola are good 
examples. The process of reservoir/source identification is time consuming 
involving humans, animals, and the environment. It also carries a level of 
uncertainty to some extent. Despite the availability of many theories, the source 
of MERS as an example is not fully understood. In some instances, the reservoir 
may not be determined. On the other hand, some outbreaks such as HIV have 
no known natural reservoir. However, HIV is transmitted solely by exposure to an 
infected person’s body fluid. In this case, the reservoir is known as the infected 
human being and the answer to the second question is yes. It is expected that 
the reservoir/source is not known for many outbreaks at least at the beginning of 
the outbreak.  
          The mode of transmission is an important factor due to concern about 
breaking the transmission pathway. The level of knowledge that leads to 
interruption of transmission should be considered as Yes to the third question. 
The mode of transmission includes many questions such as the source of 
infection, presence of a vector, transmission route, and other questions. 
However, the level of knowledge that is considered sufficient at least theoretically 
to stop or break the transmission cycle should be counted as a yes answer for 
this question.      
           The incubation period is almost always a range of days or even months. 
The time needed for an infected person to show the manifestation of the disease 
is an important aspect of this Index. It is also the time required for 
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isolation/quarantine that will enable investigators to determine that containment 
has occurred. An awareness of the incubation period is critical for directing the 
diagnostic and therapeutic effort especially after determination of the infection 
source. A new outbreak of an unknown disease will have an uncertain incubation 
period. However, understanding of incubation period will lead to a better 
understanding of an effective strategy to contain the outbreak and at the same 
time would lead to a decrease in the severity index of outbreak. 
           The fifth question regards the availability of diagnostic tools. There are 
primarily two types of diagnostic procedures; the screening and the confirmatory. 
Both are important. However, in the last few important outbreaks, the screening 
test seems more important. Identification of a specific virus such as Ebola or 
MERS was achieved by expensive and highly complicated methods such as 
PCR and viral culture. These methods were not widely available and required 
some level of expertise and were time consuming. The real need in the field was 
for a reasonable screening test. Having such screening test would save time and 
resources and would help in the containment of the outbreak by isolation or other 
means. The strength of screening is another question that involves some 
measurement such as specificity and sensitivity. There is no cut off point in the 
predictive value for any screening test that will be used in this proposed severity 
index. However, the answer to the fifth question is simply; is there a screening 
test that in case of negative result the team is comfortable sending suspected 
cases back to their community with no restriction. If the investigators have such a 
screening test with the required level of negative predictive value, the fifth 
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question can be answered Yes. The positive predictive value of the test is 
important also, but lack of high predictive value would be addressed by other 
confirmatory tests.  
           In this index, five questions/factors are assessed. Each factor has 0.2 
point for a total index point of 1.0. It measures the awareness of public health 
practitioners for the outbreak that they are fighting. These factors are 
interconnected and some may have more importance than others. However, 
these factors collectively draw a picture of the outbreak agent and its movement 
from its source until its detection in the human body.                                                      
Index 2: Fatality rate: 
           The fatality rate (case-fatality ratio) may be calculated in a straightforward 
manner. However, the determination of the fatality rate may be a difficult task. It 
is the most important concern of the stakeholders. An outbreak with a 90% 
fatality rate would receive more attention than an outbreak with a 10% fatality 
rate. Including this index in the outbreak severity index is justified.  
           Determination of the fatality rate is an absolute number of deaths among 
persons who have been diagnosed with specific disease. As it has been seen in 
the outbreak of SARS and MERS, the fatality rate was different among various 
health systems and dependent on the characteristics of patients. Also, the fatality 
rate would be affected by the total number of diagnosed patients, which may not 
include all patient as in the case of the Ebola outbreak. Since the severity index 
is a dynamic index, the average fatality rate will be utilized and the score will 
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change according to use of various diagnostic processes. The fatality rate would 
be different among some people such immune-compromised patients, the 
elderly, children, and patients with comorbidities, but the severity index assesses 
the effect of the outbreak on any given population. The available data concerning 
the fatality rate of an outbreak may represent the tip of iceberg due to the issue 
of transparency or technical incompetence, but the severity index will include any 
changes in the data once it becomes available.  
             This index is calculated by dividing the total fatality rate by 100, with the 
score of this index as the result. As an example, the fatality rate of MERS was 
60% at the point of emergence of the outbreak. The fatality rate score for MERS 
at that point would be 60/100, or 0.6 of the total score of 1. The range of deadly 
outbreaks that have 100% and non-fatal outbreak that have 0% fatality rates 
represents only 10% in the Outbreak Severity Index. This low percentage of the 
total index score may produce the concern of underestimating the fatality 
characteristic of outbreaks. For two reasons this may not be of concern: (1) Most 
outbreaks receiving international attention have a fairly high fatality rate; (2) 
Fatality is not the only negative aspect of outbreaks. Poliomyelitis is a good 
example of a disease that has severe non-fatal aspects.                     
Index 3: Incidence rate:  
           Incidence rate is an important index in the assessment of severity. The 
incidence rate “measures the occurrence of disease onsets in a population per 
unit of time of follow-up” [115]. The dominator represents persons who were at 
risk of disease at specific time. However, the numerator represents the number 
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of individuals having the disease. Both the dominator and numerator may be 
difficult to calculate. Counting the total number of confirmed cases may not 
represent the total incidence of the disease due to such reasons such as 
unavailability of a confirmatory test, unavailability of a screening test, 
unavailability of disease criteria that determines screening, unavailability of 
resources to test the affected population, and other reasons. On the other hand, 
determining the number of people at risk and the time to follow-up is almost 
imposable in most cases of outbreaks. These difficulties require a modification in 
the calculation of the incidence rate. 
           The aim of the Outbreak Severity Index is to have an objective tool to 
assess outbreaks rather than precisely calculate the incidence rate. Since the 
Outbreak Severity Index measurement would be of most value at the onset of an 
emerging outbreak, evaluating an outbreak at its onset requires modification of 
the incidence rate calculation. The proposed definition of incidence rate utilized in 
the Outbreak Severity Index   is the total number of confirmed cases divided by 
the total population of the affected geographical area at the time of evaluation. 
The challenge in this definition is the determination of the representative 
geographic area, which can be described as the area that has a homogenous 
incidence of the disease. This approach leads to the possibility of having a 
separate Outbreak Severity Index for each geographical area; such as, cities, 
provinces, and countries.  
           As a result of the percentage of the modified incidence rate will be multiply 
by 1000, resulting in the value utilized for this index. The maximum difference 
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between the most affected area and the least affected area, which share the 
same value for the other indices, is 1 point on the scale of 10 (the total score of 
the Outbreak Severity Index).                    
Index 4: Ease of transmission: 
           The transmission property of outbreaks may be the most important index 
from the perspective of the public health practitioner. However, the Outbreak 
Severity Index deals with the ease of transmission as one index consisting of one 
of ten points for the total score. Influenza is an easily transmittable disease, but it 
does not receive the attention of the public due its fairly mild severity. Such would 
not be the case with HIV, a devastating disease, which requires specific contact 
methods of transmission. On other hand, most outbreaks having a reasonably 
high transmission property may be expected to get the attention of the public 
health system. The difference in the transmission capability of a specific disease 
would compensate for a lower severity of the disease when two diseases are 
compared. The more important issue is the fact that the Outbreak Severity Index 
deals with the geographic location of the disease, the people at risk, and the 
availability of resources. 
           The mode of transmission can be either contact or non-contact in nature. 
Contact includes direct, indirect, and droplet transmission. Non-contact includes 
airborne, vehicle, and vector-borne transmission [116]. Some modes of 
transmission have a greater ability of to transmit a disease than others. However, 
the ease of transmission is influenced by such factors as exposure time, 
availability of vaccination, and availability of precaution tools. It is also difficult to 
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evaluate ease of transmission by mode of transmission. The Outbreak Severity 
Index will use the basic reproduction number (R0) as a measure of ease of 
transmission. The basic reproduction number is the number of secondary cases 
that are produced by one infected case in a completely susceptible population 
[117]. If the R0 ranges between 0 and 10, the R0 will be divided by 10 to calculate 
the score of the ease of transmission index. However, some outbreaks may have 
an R0 of more than 10 such as measles [118]. Outbreaks with an R0 of more than 
10 will be score at 1.0 in this index.                     
Index 5: Availability of treatment: 
           Treatment in the proposed Outbreak Severity Index assessment has a 
broader meaning than usual. Treatment may equal cure in some definitions of 
treatment availability; however, in this proposal the definition of availability of 
treatment has been modified to serve as an accurate assessment of the 
outbreak’s situation. The Outbreak Severity Index includes the following factors: 
I. Is there any known curative treatment? 
II. Is that treatment available in area of the outbreak? 
III. Is isolation effective in controlling transmission? 
IV. Is isolation available at the area of outbreak? 
           At the beginning of most outbreaks, broad-spectrum antibiotics and 
antivirals might be the logical initial treatment. However, with advancement of 
knowledge concerning the causative agent, a more precise treatment 
approach will substitute for the initial approach. At this stage, judgment 
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concerning the availability of treatment is used. However, on occasion the 
infection is self-limiting and does not require other than appropriate 
containment procedures. The first factor deals primarily with infections that 
cause death or significant disability. These types of infections require 
treatment to prevent devastating sequel. The answer to the first question is 
Yes when a fatal disease or a disease that leads to disability has a known 
treatment that prevents death or disability.  
             Despite the availability of a known treatment, it is important to assess 
the ability of the local healthcare system to provide that treatment, which may 
involve other factors such as accessibility to healthcare, willingness of people 
to be treated, the proper and equal distribution of treatment, and other factors 
that describe the integrity of the local public health system. Answering the 
second question depends on the general ability of the local government to 
provide treatment according to the judgment of the evaluating team. Other 
factors such as local public health integrity will be assessed in a separate 
index. 
           Isolation is an important factor for the control of outbreaks. Isolation 
ranges from personal isolation of patients to quarantine of the affected area. 
Isolation may depend on the dynamic of the disease transmission. A disease 
with a short incubation period and an easy transmission route may make 
isolation impractical. Answering the third question is based primarily on the 
significance of isolation in the containment of the outbreak.   
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           The ability of local public health system to provide isolation at both the 
personal and community level is an important factor, which may be affected 
by many factors; such as, the incidence rate of the disease, the availability of 
resources, the strength of law enforcement, the willingness of the local 
authority to act, and political stability. Answering the fourth question gives a 
panoramic image of the ability of the local public health system to provide 
isolation to those cases requiring it.  
           This index has four factors that assess the availability of treatment of 
infected cases regardless of whether that treatment is medication or isolation 
with supportive measures. Each factor with a No answer will receive 0.25 
points out of a total of 1.0 for this index.                       
Index 6: Geographical communication potential: 
           Humans’ movement between different geographical areas is the nature of 
life. With the development of transportation methods over the last century, 
movement is much more rapid and easier than before. The movement between 
cities, countries, and continents is a daily practice of almost all human beings. 
The reasons for that movement are different including trading, working, 
education, tourism, as well as legal or illegal migration. From the point of view 
this proposed of Outbreak Severity Index, migration and movement of people are 
the same regardless of reason since the end result of that movement or 
migration is exposure to disease outbreaks.  
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           Infected humans movement between different areas in the world is an 
important issue in transmission of diseases. Areas with the migration of people in 
and out results in a greater risk of the dissemination of an outbreak. However, 
those areas that are relatively isolated in some way or other would be at a 
relatively lower risk of outbreak dissemination. The direction of movement 
weather entering or exiting a specific area is also important. From the 
prospective of those residing outside the outbreak’ area, the inward movement 
may be more concerning. On the other hand, the outward movement may pose a 
greater threat for those residing outside the outbreak’s area. But, which one is 
the most important? The answer to this question should depend on the work of 
the evaluating team.  
           This proposal attempts to develop an objective measurement in this index. 
However, there are number of obstacles to a universal measurement scale. 
Obstacles include the following:  
• Determining the number of people passing any geographical boundary is 
a difficult task. There is no method cut off the number of visitors or 
migrants to a specific area as high risk. It may be that the SARS outbreak 
in Hong Kong posed a higher risk of dissemination than Ebola in Liberia 
due to the number of passengers visiting Hong Kong. However, that 
distinction disappears when the comparison is between areas with 
relatively similar characteristics such as comparing Dubai with Hong Kong 
or comparing London with Paris. The total number of visitors are 
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important, but there is no critical number that poses a greater risk than 
another.  
• Type of visitor is also an important factor. Tourists and businesspersons 
normally have better healthcare accessibility and better financial capability 
as health determinants than illegal migrants. On other hand, many 
countries perform screening procedure for legal migrants and visitors, 
which do not include illegal migrants. The type of visitor or migration is a 
significant factor that would not be taken in consideration if the total 
number of visitors and migrants were the only factor in the judgment 
concerning the risk of outbreak dissemination.  
• The relativity of risk is another important factor. Despite globalization, 
some areas may pose a greater threat to their neighbors and local region 
than areas farther away. As an example, an outbreak in Mexico poses a 
threat to United States unlike an outbreak in West Africa. It also poses a 
greater threat to southern and southwestern states than northern states. 
Not only at the state level, but it also at the city level cities. San Diego may 
have greater threat from an outbreak in Mexico than Sacramento. 
           Due to these reasons, the determination of geographical potential of 
an outbreak should be assessed according the standpoint of the evaluating 
team. This score of this index will be determined by the height of the risk 
according to the potential of for geographical communication. A high-risk area 
will be given a score of 1.0 while a low-risk area will be given 0.0 points. The 
score may be different from place to place inside states/provinces, countries, 
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or continents. The global assessment of an outbreak in certain countries will 
be difficult. However, USA, most of Europe, China, and some places in 
Middle East such as Makkah (pilgrimage) may be categorized easily as 
having a high risk of dissemination. It is conceivable that most areas of the 
world could be considered as high risk of dissemination. The value of this 
index would become clear when the evaluating team deals with areas such 
West Africa (Ebola) with a relatively lower risk of dissemination to the globe 
than Hong Kong (SARS).                           
Index 7: Population density:  
           The density of population is playing a role in ease of transmission. It is not 
only due to exposure of high number of people to infection, but also due the 
situation of heavily populated areas. Deficiencies in clean sources of water, 
efficient sanitations, and good housing circumstances are often accompanying 
the residents of heavily populated areas.  
           The classification of population density from high to low could be achieved 
by many ways. However, the outbreak severity index will follow the classification 
of the United States Department of agriculture (USDA) [119] with some 
modification. The USDA’s map of global population density is classifying the 
population density into six categories. For simplification and due to smallness of 
difference between the lowest two categories, they will be counted as one 
category. The classification will be as the following: 
1. 0-10 persons/ square kilometer  (lowest). 
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2. 11- 40 persons/ square kilometer. 
3.  41- 100 persons/ square kilometer. 
4. 101- 500 persons/ square kilometer. 
5. > 500 persons/ square kilometer. 
           The width of each category is not equal. However, the purpose of this 
index is including the factor population density as outbreak dissemination factor. 
That purpose is clearly indicated between the two extremes of this scale. Each 
category will be assigned a 0.2 point of the total index score, which is 1.0. It is a 
cumulative score in which second category will be assigned with 0.4, third will be 
assigned with 0.6, fourth will be assigned with 0.8, and finally fifth score will be 
assigned with 1.0, the maximum score of this index.        
Index 8: Political stability: 
           Political stability has many direct and indirect facets that affect the spread 
of outbreaks in communities. Outbreaks are similar to the most of other disasters 
that need efficient governmental interference. It is actually hard to imagine a 
successful outbreak’s containment without governmental effort. Public health is 
by its nature a governmental duty despite the importance of collaboration with 
privet sector. Outbreak controlling involves many dimensions of work such as 
education, treatment, and prevention. However, police power as in isolation and 
quarantine is a fundamental job of public health that needs a governmental 
legitimacy. That leads to the conclusion of importance of efficient governmental 
in the process of outbreak control. 
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           The shape of governments is different around the world. Before 
assessment of the efficiency of national and local government, failed states 
should excluded and assignment with the maximum score of this index, which is 
1.0. The definition of failed state is difficult [120] and probably influenced by 
political agendas of the evaluators. However, the failed state in this proposal is 
that state, which is not able to enforce laws upon infected area. This includes civil 
war, insurgency, and famine. Corruption, inflation, inequality, and other similar 
factors would affect the government. However, these factors would not be 
included in the definition of failed state. Failed state is basically inability of 
government to manage and control outbreak due to weakness of the 
government.  
             The assessment of political stability in non-failed government would 
follow the United Nations’ ten measures of promoting and consolidation of 
democracy [121]. These recommendations are: 
1. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
2. Freedom of association. 
3. Freedom of expression and opinion. 
4. Access to power and its exercise in accordance with the rule of law. 
5. The holding of periodic free and fair elections by universal suffrage and by 
secret ballot as the expression of the will of the people. 
6. A pluralistic system of political parties and organizations. 
7. The separation of powers. 
8. The independence of the judiciary. 
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9. Transparency and accountability in public administration. 
10. Free, independent and pluralistic media. 
          Absence of factor of these ten factors will add 0.1 point to the outbreak 
severity index. In case of absence of all of these ten factors will lead to a state 
that resembling a failed state. In other word, some totalitarians countries are 
equivalent to failed state. That might not be true from the political point of view. 
However, the political stability index is measuring the ability of governments to 
deal with outbreak. Absence of transparency, as an example, may be more 
important than many other indices since it would hinder the ability of the 
evaluating team to assess the situation. However, having these factors in this 
systemic way would provide a balance appreciation of governmental 
performance.          
Index 9: Quality of local healthcare system: 
          The quality of local healthcare system is not a scale of general healthcare 
performance. It is solely for outbreak control ability. WHO had published an index 
for the world’s healthcare system [122]. However, that index includes general 
assessment factors that might not represent the ability of outbreak control. On 
the other side, CDC had published with collaboration with other organizations 
performance standards for national, state, and local public health system based 
on the ten essential public health services [123]. The limitation of this 
performance standers tool is the difficulty of measurement especially for 
countries that are not following the western model of healthcare. The focus of this 
index requires a simple and reflective instrument tool. 
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           WHO is following an outbreak management system in the form of alert 
and response operation [124]. The aim of that system is to manage the global 
outbreaks. The outbreak severity index will adopt that system for national and 
local assessment of public health ability of outbreak management. It is composed 
from the following six factors: 
1. Epidemic intelligence – systemic event detection. 
2. Event verification. 
3. Information management and dissemination. 
4. Real time alert. 
5. Coordinated rapid outbreak response. 
6. Public health logistic. 
           The assessment of these six factors will depend on the informed judgment 
of the evaluating team. These six factors will be turned to the following six 
questions: 
1. Is the local health system able to detect the infected persons efficiently?  
2. Is the local health system able to verify and authenticate the 
epidemiological information? 
3. Is the flow of information from base to head of the outbreak team and vise 
versa performed in efficient way? 
4. Is the information passed in a reasonable time that makes intervention 
efficient? 
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5. Is the response following the collected information resulting in an efficient 
and coordinated way? 
6. Is the mobilizing of public health resources (mobilizing of stakeholders) 
meeting the threat of the outbreak?  
           The efficiency in these questions is including willingness, scientific and 
financial resources, and legislations. Answering of these questions might be 
difficult in some cases. However, in absence of information, the conservative 
pathway is to consider No as an answer. It is clear that answering these 
questions will depend on subjective rather than objective measurement. 
However, the limitation of this method hopefully will not limit the usefulness of 
this index in majority of cases. Subjective assessment of West African public 
health for Ebola outbreak would not be deviated from the realistic situation 
measured by other means. It is important here to emphasize that the aim of this 
index is to measure the attitude of local public health system to mitigate the 
outbreak situation more than measuring the success of local public in controlling 
the outbreak. A public health system having these six factors would be able to 
reflect the real situation and accommodate internal and external aids to control 
an emerging outbreak. The total score of this index is 1.0. The score of this index 
will be calculated by dividing number of No answers by 6.        
Index 10: Availability of local financial and scientific resources:  
           This index is assessing the ability of local health system to achieve the 
best result in the outbreak’s control. In the previous two indices, the outbreak 
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severity index measures the executive property of the local political system and 
the tendency of local health system to have effective outbreak controlling 
executive policy. However in this index, the ability of local public health system to 
control an emerging outbreak is measured by assessing the potential financial 
and scientific resources. Availability of resources in the presence of stable 
political system and effective public health policy would indeed lead to better 
result of outbreak containment. Assessment of resources availability as a 
separate index indicates that this index by itself may help in correcting political 
and public health policies at least partially. While in absence of financial and 
scientific resources, the reform of political and public health would be more 
difficult.  
           The assessment of financial and scientific resources is a difficult task. 
Financial resources may include national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross 
National Product (GNP), and national income. On the other side, scientific 
resources may include capacity of hospital, research activity, and availability of 
high technology. The purpose of the outbreak severity index is developing a 
simple and informative assessment tool. Due to difficulty of choosing an indicator 
and measure it, the outbreak severity index will use the health expenditure per 
capita as a surrogate indicator for the following reasons: 
• Outbreak is an emergency situation by its nature. The ability of local 
public health system to fight an emerging outbreak depends on medical 
infrastructures that have been built over years rather than quick 
mobilization of resources.  
	  
59	  
	  
• Health expenditure represents in usually the highest ability of most 
countries for health. It might be true that some countries may be able to 
mobilize more resources in emergency case, but it would not be true for 
the vast majority of countries around the world especially countries that 
doesn’t have universal healthcare converge.    
           The World Bank has published the health expenditure per capita per 
country for the last few years [125]. Health expenditure varies from 13$ in Central 
African Republic to 9,715 in Norway per capita in 2013. The index score will be 
calculated by dividing the local health expenditure by the highest health 
expenditure among world’s countries in the same year. The result of that division 
will be deducted from the total score of the index, which is 1.0 and assigned as 
the score of this index.    
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
The purpose of this project is to develop an objective measurement for 
outbreak severity. This review concerns several novel outbreaks that occurred 
several years ago and one of them (SARS) is actually a story from the past. The 
intent of this severity index tool is not based on measuring the severity of 
outbreak in retrospective manner, but it is based on measuring any challenging 
new outbreak at the time it occurs. This project assumes that the evaluation was 
performed during the first few weeks of after the detection of the three outbreaks. 
This assumption is due to: 
• The actual need of evaluation is most evident at the beginning of an 
outbreak than at a later time in the outbreak. 
• The difference in severity that would result from the evaluation occurring 
during the early phase of an outbreak may show the need for prompt 
intervention. 
• The outbreak severity index is a dynamic process and can be re-applied 
later during the progression of the outbreak.  
Index 1- Novelty of the disease agent: 
           After the first case of the novel outbreak of SARS on November 16, 2002, 
the five questions of the novelty index were totally unknown until almost five 
months into the outbreak when the causative agent was isolated on March 24, 
2003, and believed to be a new coronavirus strain [126]. During this period, 
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hundreds of cases were reported around the globe. The five questions of novelty 
were unanswered. At this point of time, the novelty score would be 1 for SARS. 
The exception is the mode of transmission, which was assumed to occur through 
arousal exposure; although tracking the transmission path was difficult without 
identifying the causative agent.   
           MERS was identified in a different scenario, being diagnosed in The 
Netherlands after a Saudi clinical sample was sent to Europe for examination. 
However, a retrospective diagnosis for another case from Jordan was performed 
for a deceased patient. The MERS outbreak started by identifying the causative 
agent. The diagnosis was performed by rt-PCR, No other diagnostic tool was 
available [127]. On other hand, source, mode of transmission, and the incubation 
period were not clear; thus the novelty score for MERS was 0.6. 
           The Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014 was preceded by more than 10 
outbreaks over the last several decades. It is interesting that most of the 
literatures concerning Ebola was produced in the late 1990s after an outbreak in 
Central Africa. The diagnosis of Ebola occurred early in the course of the 
outbreak following the death of 50 cases [128]. Despite the severity of the 
disease when compared with previous outbreaks, the answers for the novelty five 
questions were clear. The Novelty score for Ebola at the time of detection was 
0.0.    
Index 2- Fatality Rate:              
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           The overall case fatality rate for SARS was between 14% and 15%. 
Taking 15% as more conservative rate, the severity index for the fatality rate is 
15/100=0.15.  However, the fatality rate was calculated after the end of outbreak. 
Transparency was an important issue at the beginning of SARS outbreak in 
China. The fatality rate was different for the several countries involved in this 
outbreak and different based on the age of the patients. This project will consider 
this rate as the best available at the time of the evaluation, which may be the 
case in any similar outbreak.  
           The MERS fatality rate is following an up and down path with differences 
occurring between countries involved in the outbreak. With the confirmation of 
more cases of MERS, the fatality rate is increasing. However, WHO estimates 
the overall fatality rate to be 36% [129]. 36/100 is the outbreak severity index 
score for the fatality index, which results in an index of 0.36.   
           The Ebola fatality rate is significantly different between the three West 
African countries involved. However, the overall fatality rate is 64%. It has 
reached almost 90% in some countries in previous outbreaks. 64/100 is the 
outbreak severity index for the fatality rate index, which results in an index of 
0.64.      
Index 3- Incidence rate: 
           The incidence rate is a dynamic index that changes during the course of 
the outbreak. In this project, an arbitrary point of time will be chosen to assess it, 
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chosen to be at the high point of the outbreak provided that authentic information 
is available.  
           SARS occurred in several countries around the globe. Hong Kong will be 
used as the example in this severity index evaluation since it was one of the first 
affected locations outside of China and had a significant number of cases. If 
China were chosen instead of Hong Kong, the denominator would not be the 
total population, but the affected provincial population to avoid “over-dilution” of 
incidence rate. The total cases of SARS in Hong Kong was 1755 till the end of 
May 2003 [130]. The total population of Hong Kong was 6.803 millions in 2003 
[131]. As proposed in this project, the total population is divided by the total 
number of cases to produce the index of 0.00026.     
           Saudi Arabia is the country of choice to calculate the incidence rate of 
MERS. The total number of cases of MERS in Saudi Arabia is 1033 in June 2015 
[132]. The total population of Saudi Arabia is 30.8 million [133]. The result of 
dividing total number of cases by total population produces an index of 0.000034.  
           Sierra Leone is the country of choice to calculate the incidence rate for 
Ebola. The total number of confirmed cases of Ebola is 8692 in July 2015 [102]. 
The total population of Sierra Leone is 5.879 millions [134], with a resulting index 
of  0.0015. 
           The result of these calculations makes it difficult to capture the effect of 
the incidence of each outbreak in the outbreak severity index. To make the 
incidence more reflective another modification will be applied by multiplying the 
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result by 1000. This re-calculation of the outbreak severity index is based on 
producing an index score based on an incidence of 1 per 1000 population. 
However, what if the incidence of were significantly higher than 1/1000? An 
outbreak with higher incidence rate will be underestimated by this modification. 
However, an outbreak with a very high incidence rate is rare and other factors in 
the severity index would theoretically capture other important characteristics. 
Index 4- Ease of transmission: 
           The basic reproductive number (R0) is indicator for the ease of 
transmission index. The R0 for SARS is 3, which is in consistent with direct 
contact or large droplet spread of the virus [13]. By dividing the SARS R0 by 10, 
the result is 0.3, which will be added to outbreak severity index for the index of 
ease of transmission.  
           The basic reproductive number (R0) for MERS is different based on the 
location of the outbreak. In Jeddah, the R0 is between 3.5 and 6.7. However, in 
Riyadh, the R0 is between 2.0 and 2.8 [135]. On the other hand, other studies 
suggest that the R0 of MERS is less than 1.0 [136]. Taking a conservative 
approach, the average of the R0 for the two main cities will be utilized in the 
calculation of this index. The average of 3.5, 6.7, 2.0, and 2.8 is 3.75. Dividing 
the average R0 of 3.75 by 10 will result in an average of 0.38, which will be the 
MERS score for ease of transmission in the outbreak severity index.   
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           The basic reproductive number (R0) for Ebola is 2.7 [73]. Dividing this R0 
by 10 results in 0.27, and this result will be the score of Ebola ease of 
transmission in the outbreak severity index.   
Index 5- Availability of treatment: 
           The answers to the following four questions will be used to calculate this 
index: 
I. Is there any known curative treatment? 
II. Is that treatment available in area of the outbreak? 
III. Is the isolation procedure able to control transmission? 
IV. Is that isolation procedure available at the area of outbreak? 
           For all of the three outbreaks, which are under evaluation in this project, 
there is no curative treatment. The available treatments are trials of broad-
spectrum antiviral agents and interferon resulting in different rates of success. 
However, no one of these treatments can be claimed to be curative. The second 
question is not useful since there is no definitive treatment. West African 
countries do not have the capability to utilize the available treatment modalities or 
supportive measures. However, the effectiveness of supportive measures is 
limited. As a result, 0.5 will be added for each outbreak in the outbreak severity 
index. 
           For the third and fourth questions, the R0 for the three outbreaks was not 
high and isolation demonstrated its effectiveness. Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia 
due to their resources were able to apply effective isolation. West African 
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countries on the other hand had very limited resources to apply isolation 
techniques. As a result 0.25 will be added to the outbreak of Ebola since isolation 
appears to be effective, but was not available in the area of outbreak.   
Index 6- Geographical communication potential: 
           The evaluation of geographical communication potential needs to define 
the starting point of the evaluator. In this project, the starting point will be the risk 
of transmission of an outbreak to the USA. Hong Kong will be considered as the 
high point of communication due to trade and tourism and will be assigned the 
full score of 1.0. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States will be considered as a 
high area of communication due to Hajj, trade, and educational movement. 
However, West Africa will be considered as an area of low communication 
potential and a score of 0.0 will be assigned for this index. This evaluation is 
subjective in nature. Nevertheless, the perception of danger of disease spread is 
important in this evaluation tool. 
Index 7- population density: 
           The population density of Hong Kong was 6,690 individuals per square 
kilometer in 2010, which will be utilized in considering the SARS outbreak that 
occurred in 2003 and it is believed that no major change has occurred 
subsequently. [137]. This high density of population will result in assigning the full 
score for this index to Hong Kong in the outbreak severity index. The population 
density in Saudi Arabia was 13 per square kilometer in 2013 [137], resulting in 
giving MERS in Saudi Arabia a score of 0.4 for this index in the outbreak severity 
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index. The population densities for Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea are 
between 45 and 86 [133, which result in a score of 0.6 for this index in the 
outbreak severity index for Ebola.    
Index 8- Political stability: 
           The ten measures for promotion and consolidation of democracy will be 
assessed for Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, and Sierra Leone. Each No in the 
following table will be assigned a score of 0.1 and the result of the ten summed 
to calculate the score of this index. The final score will be added to the outbreak 
severity index for the corresponding disease outbreak. Answering these 
questions could be performed using information available in the public domain or 
even by best judgment of the evaluation team. In this project, the score for 
political rights and civil liberties published by the non-governmental organization 
of Freedom House [138] will be used to answer most of the questions. Freedom 
House has a specific categorization for the democracy indices. Democracy 
indices are divided into two categories, the first deals with political rights and the 
second with civil liberties. Also, Freedom house has a specific scoring process, 
which ranges from 7 (worst) to 1 (free). Also, each index has its own scoring 
point. As a general rule, any score equal to or less than half of the total score for 
each index will be considered as no in the ten questions table.     
 Hong 
Kong 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Sierra 
Leone 
1-Respect for human rights and fundamental NO NO YES 
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freedoms. 
2-Freedom of association. YES NO YES 
3-Freedom of expression and opinion. YES NO YES 
4-Access to power and its exercise in accordance 
with the rule of law. 
YES NO YES 
5-The holding of periodic free and fair elections by 
universal suffrage and by secret ballot as the 
expression of the will of the people. 
NO NO YES 
6-A pluralistic system of political parties and 
organizations. 
NO NO YES 
7-The separation of powers. NO NO YES 
8-The independence of the judiciary. YES NO YES 
9-Transparency and accountability in public 
administration. 
YES NO YES 
10 Free, independent and pluralistic media. YES NO YES 
Total Score of 
Political stability 
0.4 1.0 0.0 
  Table	  1:	  Ten	  measures	  of	  political	  stability 
 
Index 9- Quality of local healthcare system: 
           It should be kept in mind that answering of the six questions to calculate 
the quality of local healthcare system index might be controversial and 
debatable. The evaluating team should expect some obscurity in information and 
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expect to use its best judgment to determine the quality of any specific public 
health system. The focus of this index should concentrate on the attitudes and 
capabilities of the public health system to detect, monitor, and control the 
outbreak. In the following table, this review will attempt to answer these 
questions from studies and reports that have been produced following these 
outbreaks [139][140][141]. However, these studies and reports are not 
comprehensive and fully informative. Personal and team judgment should be 
applied using the best available resources. Judgment should also be applied in 
the absence of information using the best estimate such as giving the Ebola 
outbreak in Sierra Leone a score of 1.0 since this country is suffering from 
poverty and a limitation of healthcare services. Countries such as Saudi Arabia 
and Hong Kong, which have reasonably good resources, and a moderate level of 
healthcare, may be assigned a score of 0.5 in the absence of specific 
information. However, this judgment score should be revised once better 
information is available.       
 
 Hong 
Kong 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Sierra 
Leone 
Is the local health system able to detect the infected 
persons efficiently?  
YES YES NO 
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Is the local health system able to verify and 
authenticate the epidemiological information? 
YES YES NO 
Is the flow of information from base to head of the 
outbreak team and vise versa performed in efficient 
way? 
YES YES NO 
Is the information passed in a reasonable time that 
makes intervention efficient? 
YES YES NO 
Is the response following the collected information 
resulting in an efficient and coordinated way? 
YES NO NO 
Is the mobilizing of public health resources (mobilizing 
of stakeholders) meeting the threat of the outbreak?  
YES YES NO 
Total score of quality of healthcare system = 
(NO/6) 
0.0 0.17 1.0 
Table	  2:	  Six	  measures	  of	  quality	  of	  local	  healthcare	  system. 
           Uncertainty and arbitrariness may be an issue in this index. However, 
public health in West African may be considered as failing to afford reasonable 
protection of the population. On the other hand, public health systems in Saudi 
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Arabia and Hong Kong may be not adequate. Despite the uncertainty, the margin 
of error appears reasonable.      
Index 10- Availability of local financial and scientific resources: 
           The Hong Kong health expenditure per capita is $ 1860 in 2015 [142], and 
dividing this expenditure by the highest national expenditure, Norway, ($ 9,715 in 
2013) results in a ratio of 0.19. The rationale for using different expenditure years 
is due to the unavailability of information. Subtracting the ratio of 0.19 from the 
total score of this index yields a score of 0.81. Saudi Arabian health expenditures 
were $ 808 per capita in 2013. Dividing 808 by 9715 and subtracting the result 
from 1.0 results in a score of 0.92. Health expenditure in Sierra Leone was $ 96 
per capita and dividing 96 by 9715 and subtracting the result from 1.0 produces a 
result of 0.99.   
Outbreak severity index SARS MERS Ebola 
1-Novelty of the disease agent 1.0 0.6 0.0 
2-Fatality rate 0.15 0.36 0.64 
3-incidence rate  0.26 0.03 1.0 
4- Easiness of transmission 0.3 0.38 0.27 
5-Availability of treatment 0.5 0.5 0.5 
6- Geographical communication potential 1.0 1.0 0.0 
7- Population density  1.0 0.4 0.6 
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8- Political stability 0.4 1.0 0.0 
9- Quality of local healthcare system 0.0 0.17 1.0 
10- Availability of local financial and scientific 
resources 
0.81 0.92 0.99 
Total Score 5.42 5.36 5.0 
Table	  3:	  Summery	  of	  the	  final	  scores	  of	  Outbreak	  Severity	  Index. 
   
Interpretation: 
           The result of the outbreak severity index shows that SARS has a score of 
5.42, while MERS and Ebola score 5.36 and 5.0 respectively. These results 
demonstrate that these outbreaks were almost equal in their severity. The 
following table demonstrates common criteria that could be used to evaluate the 
severity of such outbreaks by newspapers or other media outlets in the absence 
of a structured tool such as the one proposed in this project: 
Criteria  SARS MERS Ebola 
Total number of cases 8098 
[143] 
956 
 [144] 
12018 
[145] 
Case fatality rate 9.6 % 
[139] 
37% 
[140] 
50% 
[105] 
Mode of transmission Person-to Person-to Person-to 
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person  person  person  
Country/s been affected  Asia 
(mainly) 
Middle 
East  
West 
Africa 
Table	  4:	  Outbreak	  evaluation	  by	  general	  media.           
           This example of information that is available to the media may represent 
public health practitioners’ knowledge concerning such outbreaks. The public 
health activists and the decision-making groups would be struck by these data or 
they may mistakenly underestimate others depending on known facts associated 
with each outbreak. However, the outbreak severity index indicates that the three 
outbreaks studied have almost the same severity despite the data available in 
the media. However, it is interesting that although these three outbreaks have 
similar outbreak severity indexes, less than 1000 individuals have died of MERS, 
while Ebola has produced 12,000 confirmed deaths. The fatality rate of SARS 
was less than 10%, while the fatality rate of Ebola exceeds 50%. 
           The essence of an outbreak severity index is to establish a 
comprehensive tool that may take into account other important factors that affect 
the spread of an outbreak rather than accept an out of context number. Canada 
has an excellent public health system and significant financial and scientific 
resources, but its SARS fatality rate was 17% [139] and was unable to improve 
on the results noted by other countries affected by SARS. This reflects that 
SARS was highly virulent and despite the efforts exerted in the treatment 
process, the fatality rate was high. On the other hand, Ebola has a very high 
fatality rate when compared to MERS, but in a country with an inadequate health 
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system and limited educational resources, it has the same danger as MERS or 
SARS. Funeral ceremonies for infected persons were linked to the spread of 
Ebola in West Africa. This mismanagement of dead bodies would be easily 
solved in developed countries. Lack of financial resources and support to contain 
Ebola cases may play a key rule in this high number of cases of West Africa 
rather than the virulence of disease itself. MERS seems to have less 
transmissibility than SARS; however, new cases of MERS continue despite the 
fact that the affected countries in the Arabian Peninsula are wealthy. The 
mismanagement of the MERS outbreak makes eradication of the disease 
difficult, while SARS was eradicated within a year. 
           Assessment of the validity and reliability of the outbreak severity index as 
a public health surveillance tool is a challenge. This challenge is not only due to 
the limited number of outbreaks that can be tested, but the end result of the 
outbreak severity index is vague. There are many parameters for tracking a 
devastating outbreak such as the number of cases, case fatality rate, mode of 
transmission, as well as others. However, should one of these parameters be 
selected for monitoring outbreaks, the question may be raised as to why such a 
complex tool as the outbreaks severity index should be developed to measure a 
simple outcome parameter. Assessment of the validity and reliability of the 
outbreak severity index appears premature at this stage of its development. 
Weak points of this evaluation: 
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           In the evaluation of SARS, MERS, and Ebola using the outbreak severity 
index, certain weaknesses were encountered. These weaknesses were due to 
structural, informational, and conceptual factors. It should be clear that this tool is 
at an early stage of development and further trials and sharpening of the various 
indexes comprising it are warranted. The weaknesses of the index include:         
I. Discrepancy in time of evaluation: 
           SARS as one of outbreaks that was assessed in this project is an 
outbreak that has been resolved for more than a decade. However, MERS and 
Ebola are still a challenge for global health. Some of the information utilized in 
the severity index may not be available at the beginning of an outbreak. 
Retrospective evaluation of SARS may reduce the validity of the outbreak 
severity index when compared with MERS and Ebola, which are still occurring. 
However, the outbreak severity index is a dynamic assessment tool and should 
accommodate changes.        
II. Reference score: 
           The result of the outbreak severity index demonstrates the similarity of 
these three outbreaks with a score of approximately 5 out of 10. On the other 
hand, a reference point for a previous outbreak is not available for comparison. 
Even historic outbreaks such as the Spanish Flu pandemic early in the 20th 
century would not be applicable to this assessment tool due to the advancement 
of technology and information systems and political change. Sequentially using 
the outbreak severity index in future should lead to a reference point for its use.       
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III. When it would work the best: 
The outbreak severity index is a tool that should be utilized in the face of 
the uncertainty and chaos accompanying the onset of an outbreak. It is 
not primarily a tool for retrospective assessment. The severity 
determination of an outbreak should be followed by procedures that 
contain and prevent the spread of such an outbreak at the local, regional, 
and international level. Also, the score of any of the three outbreaks that 
have been reviewed in this project might be different according to the level 
of information available at the beginning of each outbreak.       
IV. Stakeholders’ Testimonies: 
           Some of the outbreaks, which were reviewed in this project, have a bulk of 
literature regarding many properties of each outbreak that might not available for 
an evaluating team facing a new threatening outbreak. This could limit the validity 
of this review. The quality of this assessment tool may be enhanced by reviewing 
the testimonies of the stakeholders who dealt with a specific outbreak.  Allowing 
a change in the score of the outbreak severity index when more information 
becomes available may reveal its sensitivity.    
V. Default scores: 
Since the outbreak severity index has 10 indices, some information 
concerning and outbreak may not be available to the evaluating team at 
the time of assessment. The absence of information may lead to an 
inappropriate evaluation. However, the default pathway in the case of 
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unavailable information should be handled in a conservative manner. It is 
much safer to overestimate an outbreak and be prepared accordingly than 
to underestimate an outbreak. A full score of an index should be assigned 
to any of the ten sub-indexes when the evaluating team has no objective 
information. Also, some of outbreak severity sub-indices have a number of 
questions that must be answered to reach a score for that sub-index. The 
same conservative attitude should prevail.         
VI. Math vs. appreciation: 
           The outbreak severity index has been formulated through a mathematical 
approach to reach a digital score. However, this mathematical approach should 
not obscure the fact that it is an objective measurement for an emergency 
situation. It is based in the most part on an appreciation for a concurrent situation 
utilizing the best available information. Some of this information may not be 
available at the time of the emergence of an outbreak. It should be understood 
that ambiguity is of the nature of emergencies. Emphasis should be applied on 
updating the outbreak severity index once new data is available. Also, it should 
be acceptable that an outbreak severity index score may differ from place to 
place and from evaluating team to evaluating team since it measures partially the 
perception of danger from the outbreak.      
VII. Consensus building:  
           Severity index measurement tools are present in both medical and natural 
disaster arenas. Pneumonia severity index, head injury severity index, and 
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pancreatitis severity index are examples of medical measurement tools. 
Earthquake severity index [146], and hurricane severity index [147] are example 
of natural disaster measurement tools. A disease outbreak shares the same 
properties of medical and natural disaster emergencies, making consensus 
building a difficult task since comprehensive work of a group of professionals with 
different backgrounds is required. Fortunately, the public health community is the 
best place to start this process due to the wide differences in public health 
professionals’ backgrounds.  
           The first step in developing an outbreak severity index is to propose such 
an efficient and useful tool based on an academic and research process. The 
process of establishing of such tool appears to be an important step in building 
consensus. In this step, a single proposal is not sufficient. It needs to be followed 
by other proposals to insure its usefulness and effectiveness. Examination of its 
reliability and validity is required in an academic setting. Building consensus is a 
lengthy process. However, public health professionals should initiate the process 
of development of such a tool.           
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CHAPTER 5 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 
           An outbreak severity index is a tool that is intended to evaluate disease 
outbreaks in anticipation of preventing or controlling the spread of disease. This 
measurement tool may be used at any given time period during the emergence 
of an outbreak. The public health community requires a better tool for assessing 
the severity of an outbreak and implementing that assessment in disaster 
preparedness. Depending on news reports about an emerging outbreak should 
not be the normal public health practice especially after it has been revealed in 
various social media. The duty of public health agencies during emergencies is to 
lead. The traditional definition of an outbreak does not satisfy the need for 
intervening and mitigating a global outbreak. The outbreak severity index is a tool 
that may motivate an appropriate response to a disease outbreak. The following 
points address the steps that follow after the determination of the severity of a 
disease outbreak:     
1-The right of international to access the available information:  
           Information is a key element in fighting a disease outbreak. However, 
there are many barriers that prevent the flow of information. The two main 
barriers are the inability to obtain information and political unwillingness to 
release such information. 
           Lack of the ability to gather information such as occurred in the case of 
Ebola in West Africa is a major challenge. This inability occurred due to an 
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inefficient public health information system and interestingly enough due to the 
attitude of distrust by the local population. A conspiracy theory prevailed among 
the local population affected by Ebola based on the theory that foreigners 
created the disease. However, such an attitude could be alleviated by the 
including of key persons in the local community in the fight against Ebola. 
Inclusion of key persons in these communities would not only help in changing 
attitudes of distrust, but also in changing local customs such as funeral 
ceremonies.  
           A failure in transparency was evident in China (SARS) and Saudi Arabia 
(MERS) based on a political unwillingness to inform the international community 
of the disease outbreak. Some reports indicated that SARS was many fold worse 
than admitted [148]. Saudi Arabia was criticized in its effort to control MERS 
[149]. On other hand, the WHO was criticized for its dealing with Ebola [150]. The 
WHO is a product of the contemporary international political system with all of its 
pros and cons. Also, the WHO is affected by its level of funding and political 
issues. Such governmental behavior should be changed and efforts should be 
made to guarantee a better flow of information.                  
2-The right of international organizations to investigate: 
           Disease outbreak does not recognize political borders or national 
boundaries. Rather is often undetectable as it moves around the globe that acts 
as a small village during an age of easy and fast communication.  During such 
global outbreaks, the number of stakeholders expanded such that an outbreak 
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involves every human being. SARS in Hong Kong was easily transmitted to a 
North American city.  
           Admitting that the whole population of the world are at risk of been 
infected should lead to accepting the right to know and to investigate. The reality 
of the current geopolitical situation is that it is difficult to accept such a concept of 
interference into national issues. However, the public health community should 
exert more effort to make this kind of engagement acceptable and palatable. 
Terrorism is a good example of how different political systems are willing to 
cooperate. A global disease outbreak does not pose any lesser danger than 
terrorism.  
3- Application of the precautionary principle: 
         The precautionary principle should be used as an efficient way to promote 
cooperation between international political and public entities. It should be clear 
that an individual country would bear the responsibility of non-cooperative 
behavior. Countries that elect not cooperate should face serious consequences 
such as a boycott, which seem radical to propose for a country that refuses 
cooperation and transparency. However, quarantine is a form of boycott and has 
been used to contain outbreaks in the past. Public health/ global health 
diplomacy was almost absent in these three outbreaks, a failure should not 
shape the future.           
4- International Preventive Task Force, sharing of costs and representation: 
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           Alternative approaches such as an international collaborative task force 
has been shown to be highly effective in the eradication of smallpox. Building 
similar collaborative task forces for fighting emergent disease outbreaks may 
produce improved results. This task force should include both governmental and 
public cadres, with a vision and mission to mitigate a specific international 
disease outbreak. The purpose of this task force is not to undermine the work of 
the WHO or other international agencies, but rather to support their efforts and to 
reduce bureaucratic and political issues. 
           One of the main deterrents to form such a task force is its funding. 
However, a disease outbreak does not solely happen in poor countries as has 
been experienced in the case of SARS and MERS. Volunteers should be 
encouraged to join such a task force. The other deterrent is political acceptance 
of the efforts of such a task force. Preemption authority of such task force would 
a source of dispute, but such disputes may be solved by fair representation on 
the task force including local involvement. The establishment of such a task force 
would promote international cooperation, the exchange of information, and limit 
the bureaucracy inherent in a disease outbreak. It would provide a platform for 
accepting funding and volunteers and serve as a distribution point to areas that 
are in need of support.                         
5- Application of public health police power: 
           Public health police power such as quarantine and closed boarders and/or 
boycotts should not be underestimated as a procedure for outbreak containment. 
However, the actual situation may make this choice very difficult provoking a 
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political response. Also, historically boycotts have been misused for unjustified 
reasons. At the beginning of an outbreak, this choice would be too extreme to be 
considered. Nevertheless, with an increase in the number of cases, many states 
may resort to this choice.  
           Public health and global health professionals should initiate the discussion 
regarding the regulation of the concept of an international quarantine. A preset 
announcement of such a regulation would serve to legitimize this kind of 
procedure. It should be fair, equitable, and supportive for countries that are 
engaged in fighting a disease outbreak.             
6- Sustainable intervention: 
           The use of the outbreak severity index should not only be a defense 
mechanism against outbreak, but it should be used as a tool to direct support 
and intervention in the area of the outbreak especially in areas that are 
underdeveloped and under-resourced. The outbreak severity index is a tool for 
evaluating the virulence of an outbreak agent and the local capabilities of fighting 
the outbreak. Utilizing the outbreak severity index in a local social, political, and 
demographic approach should mitigate deficiencies and scarcities in fighting the 
disease outbreak.  
           A sustainable intervention is based on involving the local population rather 
than depending only on external aid. Sustainable intervention includes 
developing local community resources, education, training, and advocating. West 
Africa as an example is in great need of engagement that promotes community 
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resources. Building trust by engaging the local population in rebuilding of 
community’s resources is a key factor for success in an atmosphere of doubt.             
 
Conclusion: 
           The outbreak severity index is a measurement tool that is useful in public 
health practice to justify precaution and to justify interference. The review of the 
last several disease outbreaks, SARS, MERS, and Ebola, demonstrated 
moderate global outbreaks. Public health needs an assessment tool for local and 
global outbreaks that would direct the best international intervention. The score 
of the outbreak severity index could be used for such a purpose. This 
measurement tool is still in the early stages of development and more effort is 
needed to make it a more useful and reliable tool.       
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